international law towards a law of cooperation rather than just co-existence between States. A positive understanding of jurisdiction implies that States may sometimes be obliged to exercise jurisdiction (rather than just being allowed to, let alone being precluded from doing so), especially in respect of values dear to the international community. Thus, a number of conventions provide for a State's obligation to establish its criminal jurisdiction over the presumed offender of a particularly grave crime (e.g., a war crime, an act of torture, or an act of terrorism), provided that this person is present on the territory, and the State does not extradite him (the aut dedere aut judicare clause). 9 In the field of international human rights law, the concept of jurisdiction has similarly acquired an obligatory dimension, in that States that are Contracting Parties to human rights treaties are required to secure the rights to individuals falling within their jurisdiction, 10 even if these individuals find themselves outside their territory. Lotus, however, starting with the Harvard Research on International Law's 'Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime', 14 it appears that the international community has embraced a more restrictive approach, by requiring that the asserting State rely on a permissive principle for the exercise of jurisdiction to be lawful. 15 In this chapter, we will primarily focus on prescriptive jurisdiction, although in this Section the related forms of jurisdiction known as 'enforcement', 'adjudicatory', and 'functional' jurisdiction will be clarified.
The most uncontested permissive principle of prescriptive jurisdiction, in light of the 17 Under the territoriality principle as applied to cybercrime, the odds of there being more than one locus delicti are high (criminal content may be accessed in multiple jurisdictions), and accordingly, the risk of jurisdictional conflict looms large. This is further compounded by the fact that cybercrime is rarely a single crime, but rather a conglomerate of criminal acts that are all more or less related to each other. In addition, as long as cybercrime is underregulated, the exercise of Internet jurisdiction may possibly raise human rights rather than jurisdictional concerns: individuals may not have expected to be subjected to foreign legislation and law-enforcement, especially when they have not specifically directed content at users located in the foreign State, and when the production of such content was lawful under the law of their 
Presumption against extraterritorially
The international law of jurisdiction is mainly developed through, and applied by domestic courts and regulators, with little guidance having been given by international courts. In some jurisdictions, the international law of jurisdiction has played a rather limited role in circumscribing the reach ratione loci of domestic laws. This is especially so in the United 
Jurisdictional reasonableness
As can be collected from the overview of permissive principles of prescriptive jurisdiction,
States can invoke a variety of jurisdictional grounds to address one and the same situation.
Moreover, a multitude of States can potentially claim jurisdiction on the basis of the perceived transboundary effects of just one act. Inevitably, this may give rise to international friction.
Unfortunately, international law has not (yet) come up with a rule that could resolve conflicts arising from overlapping, prima facie lawful jurisdictional claims. There is no rule giving priority to the 'most interested' or 'affected' State, although it may appear logical to give the territorial State, given the territorial anchoring of the law of jurisdiction, first right of way. been hailed as a 'shift from a focus on power to a focus on interests' as regards extraterritorial paramount nationality is entirely unknown in national and international law. Territoriality, not nationality, is the customary and preferred base of jurisdiction.'). 47 In E Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) several companies that were purchasing and reselling vitamins sued several vitamin manufacturers for illegal attempts to raise prices, both within the United States and in foreign countries. The manufacturers asked the district judge to dismiss several of the vitamin purchasers from the case because they only did business in other countries and, the manufacturers argued, could therefore not bring claims under the U.S. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA/Sherman Act). The purchasers countered that the foreign price-fixing attempts were linked to the domestic attempts and could therefore be heard under the exception to the FTAIA. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that where anticompetitive behaviour, such as a price-fixing agreement, 'significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the United States and customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect', plaintiffs who allege that they have been injured by the 'foreign effect' cannot invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws or courts. 
Heeding other States' concerns
Since the propriety of a jurisdictional assertion is determined by the State itself, with little to no international supervision, it is almost inevitable that the exercise of jurisdiction is prone to subjective, and even parochial interpretations. Still, as thanks to the rise of information and States, when holding that the Alien Tort Statute was not meant to apply to 'foreign-cubed' been engaged in anticompetitive practices of whatever origin that are substantially and adversely affecting its interests, may request consultation with such other Member country or countries recognising that entering into such consultations is without prejudice to any action under its competition law and to the full freedom of ultimate decision of the Member countries concerned.'). 55 Article 6 of the 1998 Comity Agreement between the United States and the European Union. Whereas negative comity refers to the regulating State refraining from exercising jurisdiction because another State's interests may be more important (ie the traditional comity concept of jurisdictional restraint), positive comity refers to the competition authorities of a requesting party 'requesting the competition authorities of a requested party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy anticompetitive activities in accordance with the requested party's competition laws'. 56 Cf the exemptions from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act granted by the SEC and the PCAOB, and the exemptions to be granted under the EC Statutory Audit Directive. Commonality (full harmonization) in the field of capital markets law has actually been deemed illusive by one of its main advocates, who instead believed that only reciprocity would be feasible. claims which do not 'touch and concern' the United States. 60 Indeed, the Commission, while not casting doubt on the legality of the exercise of universal tort jurisdiction as such, had reminded the Court to exercise this jurisdiction reasonably. 61 And in a more strongly worded brief, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands argued that the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction risks trampling on a foreign nation's prerogative to "regulate its own commercial affairs," 62 and could adversely affect "much needed direct foreign investment" in host countries.
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Subsidiarity in the law of jurisdiction
In a variation on the jurisdictional rule of reason, it is suggested here that States, after hearing the views of other States, and arguably also foreign persons and businesses potentially subject to extraterritorial regulation, should refrain from exercising jurisdiction when another State is, Directive is in keeping with the public international law principle of territoriality). Accordingly, the Aviation Directive does not have universal application, in that it would subject all flights to EU law. The US, for its part, when enforcing its anti-corruption legislation (FCPA), has similarly relied on a broad interpretation of territoriality. The FCPA applies to 'any person' acting within US territory, notably if it causes, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of the corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the US (FCPA § § 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3). This provision has allowed the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission to bring corruption proceedings against foreign persons whose bribery acts may have had only a tenuous connection with the US, for example routing payment through US bank accounts or sending an email to a US company (see, e.g., United States v Technip SA (Plea Agreement) (SD Tex, No 4:10-CR-00439, 28 June 2010). The U.S. enforcement agencies could thus bring claims against foreign issuers in respect of the bribery of foreign officials without any nexus with the US, except their listing of stock on a US exchange (FCPA § 78dd-1(g)), and (in respect of foreign bribery) against foreign persons whose stock is not even listed in the US, on the sole basis that some act furthering bribery has a link with the US (Ibid § 78dd-2(i)).
has failed to materialize may increase the legitimacy of the assertion. 89 Such an assertion then becomes an exercise of subsidiary jurisdiction in the face of a collective action problem.
Concluding observations
One may be tempted to believe that many jurisdictional problems will lose their salience as soon as transnational or global governance problems are adequately dealt with at a multilateral level, e.g., when an international competition law regime is established, or when the International Civil Aviation Organization reaches agreement on aviation emissions caps, thereby obviating the need for unilateral, extraterritorial State action. At a theoretical level, that may well be true. In practice, however, individual States will continue to play the leading role in global governance in the face of the elusiveness of relevant multilateral agreements and centralized institutions. 90 Even in respect of international crimes can the existing, permanent
International Criminal Court only deal with a small number of atrocity cases.
Accordingly, the unilateral exercise of jurisdiction by States, or regional organizations, will be there to stay, to 'recast global problems in local terms' in Buxbaum's words. 91 One cannot deny that such unilateralism may well lead to abuse by economically and politically powerful States, 92 who may tend to limit foreign operators' market access in their own national rather than global interest. 93 In addition, it could lead to regulatory chaos where numerous States
